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I. INTRODUCTION
Alan Watson has provided us with abundant and beautiful evidence that
"most changes in most systems are the result of borrowing."' But as a legal
historian and comparative lawyer, Watson has not only been concerned with
showing the importance of legal transplants; he has also emphasized the need
for study of "the nature of legal development."' However, he considers
evolutionary theory, or any theory whatsoever, as too general for this purpose:'
"[t]here is no equivalent of the 'invisible hand' of economics that under perfect
conditions would keep a balance between supply and demand."4 Yet, one need
not go so far as to contend that a theory of legal development should be
applicable to all societies for all time and then reject such a theory as being too
general to explain the evidence that is present. In the following Article, I
intend to make use of evolutionary theory to obtain a better insight into the
present debate on harmonisation of private law in Europe and the changes this
may bring to Europe's national legal systems. I consider this to be a fertile
approach: in a time when evolutionary ideas are increasingly used in various
disciplines (biology, economics, psychology, linguistics, etc.), legal science
cannot stay behind.
This Article presupposes a specific theoretical framework that is made
explicit in section II. In section lIl, the insights comparative law studies have
provided regarding the way legal systems develop are surveyed. Then, the
perspective changes to other disciplines and the experience they can provide
us in the domain of the evolution of legal norms (section IV). On the basis of
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this experience, some remarks on the future of European private law will be
made (section V).
UI. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ON THE POSSIBILITY OF UNIFORMITY IN
EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW
This Article presupposes the theoretical frameworks that uniformity of law
in most of the cases cannot be created simply by the imposition of rules in a
centralist way. Private law is-at least to some extent-more than just rules
and could, at least to some degree, be considered as part of a national legal
culture.6 Should this be different, there would not be a need to assess any
organic evolution of legal norms, other than the evolution of legislation itself;7
law would then be nothing but a positivist artefact of some Sovereign.
Moreover, it would no longer be a question of whether it is possible to predict
the extent of uniformity that can be created in the future, because this would
then follow automatically from the famous "berichtigende Worte des Gesetz-
gebers."' Two different claims are immanent in this presupposition.
The first claim states that the mere drafting and enacting of "principles" of
European private law does not in itself lead to uniformity. Private law is, to
a certain extent, harmonisation resistant, even when confronted with centrally
imposed rules. To which extent this is the case, is a question upon which this
Article intends to shine a brighter light. Too radical, however, is the
contention of Pierre Legrand that "legal systems... have not been converging,
are not converging and will not be converging."" Legrand's idea of law as
entirely embedded in the society and culture of a specific country has not been
recognized as insightful." Moreover, Legrand's idea of comparative law
' An elaboration of this framework can be found in JAN SMITs, TmE MAKING OF EUROPEAN
PRIVATE LAW (2002).
'For the most outspoken defence of this thesis, see PIERRE LEGRAND, LE DRorr COMPARt
(1999).
' This principle has been investigated by Robert C. Clark, The Morphogenesis of
Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90 (1977) [hereinafter
Statutory Evolution] and Robert C. Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90
YALE L.J. 1238 (1981) [hereinafter Legal Evolution].
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would not be recognized by many comparative lawyers as falling within the
limits of that discipline at all. F.H. Lawson, for example, once stated that
comparative law is in itself "bound to be superficial"; linking law to other
societal and cultural phenomena of a specific country would be impossible. 2
The second claim I implicitly make is that a greater extent of legal
uniformity than exists right now is possible, but should to a large extent come
about in an organic way. This opens up a whole variety of research themes
related to disciplines other than the law and aiming at the study of cases where
organic, spontaneous orders have originated through evolution and not by
creation. I have previously defended that the best way of unification of law in
Europe would be through a competition of legal rules.'3 In transplanting legal
rules from one country to another on a "market of legal culture,"'" the best
legal rule for Europe may survive. This does not automatically imply that any
rule glorifies: in some instances, diversity of law may be just as good as unifor-
mity as long as there is a free movement of legal rules, at least creating the
possibility of legal change. Some of the questions with which this theory
presents us (When will uniformity prevail? Which rule is the best to survive?
Is that rule the result of a "race to the bottom" or not? Are there differences
in the extent that various areas of a discipline are touched by the evolutionary
process?) may be provided with a preliminary answer in this Article, partly by
building on other disciplines.
IMl. SOME TRADITIONAL POINTS OF VIEW ON LEGAL CHANGE
It is surprising to see how little study has been made of the process of legal
change. Anyone interested in the process of unification of law in Europe
should be aware of the historical evidence that is present within legal systems;
it shows how a legal system copes with changes in society as a whole and
which rules are better prepared for those changes than others. The explanation
for this lack of interest is undoubtedly caused by the positivist stance that
private law studies have taken in Europe ever since the enactment of national
Civil Codes (which may also explain why the evolutionary tradition is much
stronger in Anglo-American jurisprudence). Since then, private law is merely
Lectures No. 2, METRO 2000).
' F.H. Lawson, The Field of Comparative Law, 61 JURID. REV. 16 (1949).
" Jan Snits, A European Private Law as a Mixed Legal System, 5 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. &
COMP. L. 328 (1998).
"' Cf. Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and
Economics, 37 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1994).
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looked at as a design choice of a Creator, not as an organism shaped by its
environmental conditions.
The evolutionary tradition in law that does exist is mainly related to authors
opposing codification (like Savigny)'5 or authors from the Anglo-American
tradition. 6 The most powerful application in law of evolutionary theory on the
European continent is still the work of Savigny and his Historical School,
propagating an "organically progressive jurisprudence," law being part of the
Volksgeist.'7 Savigny's view is, however, much too vague to be regarded as
a true scientific theory of legal change.'" Maine does offer such a theory, 9
although he looks at the evolution of the legal system as a whole and not so
much at the evolution of legal rules within that system. Several other
authors-influenced by the publication of Darwin's On the Origin ofSpeciesi
in 1859 or not-have offered theories on the evolution of legal institutions,"
though without taking advantage of the insights of other disciplines.'
The traditional comparative law efforts to explain why legal transplants
take place are also not of a very precise nature. Factors involved in the taking
place of legal transplants' include the prestige or quality of the exported legal
rules,' efficiency,25 the role of the national glite,26 chance,27 practical utility,'
11 F.C. VON SAVIGNY, VOM BERUF UNSRER ZErT FOR GESETZGEBUNG UND
REcHTswissENscHAFr (photo. reprint 1967) (1814).
'6 See, e.g., OUVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1851).
,v See VON SAVIGNY, supra note 15.
's Cf. E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REv.
38, 43 (1985) ("[B]y modem standards Savigny's work seems hopelessly metaphorical and
unscientific").
'9 H.J. SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1861).
20 CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OFNATuRAL SELECTION (1859).
2' For an excellent overview, see Elliott, supra note 18, at 38; see also P. STEIN, LEGAL
EVOLUTION: THE STORY OF AN IDEA (1980).
'" But see Clark, Statutory Evolution, supra note 7; Clark, Legal Evolution, supra note 7
(asserting that legal evolution should be an interdisciplinary study); Roe, infra note 60 (utilizing
the field of economics in examining the evolution of law).
23 Cf. ESINOROCO, CRITcAL COMPARATIvE LAW 121 (1999).
24 For the traditional explanation, compare Gianmaria Ajani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal
Transplants in Russia and Eastern Europe, 43 AM. . COMP. L. 93 (1995), and Alan Watson,
Aspects of Reception of Law, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 335, 345 (1996) (stressing "the need for
authority").
's See Mattei, supra note 14, at 3.
26 P.G. Monateri, The 'Weak' Law: Contaminations and Legal Cultures, in ITAUAN
NATIONALREPORTS TO THE XVTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 94 (1998).
2' See Watson, supra note 24, at 339.
28 See id. at 335.
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cultural forces29 and imposition."a These very diverse factors may indeed
explain why legal transplants take place, but a concrete relationship between
these factors and the way legal systems change is absent. What we need, then,
is a theory that can explain the examples of legal transplants with which
Watson provides us. Could interdisciplinary evolutionary theory be of use
here?
IV. SOME INSIGHTS FROM EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS
The most well known application of evolutionary theory is--of course-to
be found in biology.3 According to classical Darwinism, evolutionary change
takes place through natural selection. 2 The individual members of a species
organize their lives to produce the most surviving offspring and, in doing so,
they necessarily adapt themselves to changing circumstances.33 The descent of
one or more trees of life thus leads to a diversity of species through speciation,
extinction and the evolution of new characteristics within these species.34 In
Darwinism, this process of evolution by natural selection presupposes three
requirements.3" First, there must be variation in the species (otherwise there
would be no species that could better survive than others); second, the
variation must concern variation in fitness (understood as the ability to survive
and reproduce, with some species being more able to adapt themselves to
changing circumstances than others); and third, the characteristics that are
constituent for the fitness of the species must be inherited (otherwise, there
could be no evolution of the species as such).36 Only with these three
constituents a "struggle for life" can originate.37
" Robin Evans-Jones, Receptions of Law, Mixed Legal Systems and the Myth of the Genius
of Scots Private Law, 114 L.Q. REv. 228 (1998).
-o See Esin Oraca, Mixed and Mixing Systems: A Conceptual Search, in STUDIES IN LEGAL
SYSTEMS: MIXED AND MDNG 349 (Esin OrcO et al. eds., 1996).
1' Cf ELjIoTT SOBER, PHLOSOPHY OFBIOLOGY (1993) (evolutionary biology); J. MAYNARD
SMITH, THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION (1993); and DOUGLAS J. FuTUYMA, EVOLuTIONARY
BIOLOGY (3d ed. 1998).
See DARWIN, supra note 20.
3 See William H. Rodgers Jr., Law and Biology, in THE NEW PALORAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, VOL 11451 (1998).
- See id.
" See SOBER, supra note 3 1, at 9.
36 Id.
3 See id.
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
As to the evolution of legal rules in Europe, it is possible to transplant the
first two of these requirements. In European private law, different rules also
exist as to the solving of identical cases and presumably not all of these rules
are as "fit" as others to carry out their task. Many of the present day rules in
the various European countries are the result of a long evolution, adapting
them to the environment in which these rules had to operate. According to
evolutionary theory, other rules that once existed in these countries must have
been eliminated in this process of natural selection and any change of the
environment in the future would-again-lead to adaptation of the present
rules. The third requirement ofDarwinism, the inheritability of characteristics,
is more problematic in the context of law because of the simple fact that
descendants that take over the genes of the previous species do not exist. As
we shall see, however, other disciplines that make use of evolutionary
analysis-in particular, economics-solve this problem by identifying
analogues of genes.
Apart from these constituents of evolution, theoretical biology distinguishes
between the different possible causes of evolution. In this respect, natural
selection is only one of them, alongside with mutation, migration,
recombination and mating." What is important for the purpose of this
contribution is the discussion on what actually causes evolution ("Why do
polar bears have white fur and other bears brown fur?"). This discussion on
what is called adaptationism is about the importance of natural selection in the
process of evolution. What is the actual power of natural selection?39 The
question is important for the evolution of law because it may give us some
insight into the question of why it is that some legal rules survive and others
do not. Biology teaches us that as to the direction of the evolution, adaptation
is the main principle.' Organisms fit themselves into niches of viability
offered by their environments.4' They have to in order to survive the pressure
of selective competition from other organisms. 2 What may be of interest for
the study of law is that the direction of adaptation is usually toward simplicity,
in particular when homogenisation of the environment reduces the number of
distinct niches available. The movement is toward complexity when there are
5' Id. at 18-19.
3I Id. at 119.
40 See id.
41 See id.
42 See id.
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only a few species that proliferate within a new environment with many
unfilled niches.43 I will come back to this point later.
Theoretical biologist Sober provides us with a good insight into another
discussion." To predict what the mechanism of evolution leads to, it is
possible to make use of simple models of the selection process (for example,
in the case of the evolution ofrunning speed in zebras, fast zebras may survive
over slow zebras), taking into account only natural selection and not mutation
or other evolutionary processes and abstaining from the fact that running speed
may not evolve independently of other characteristics the zebra possesses.
Adaptationists would say that any refinement of the simple model does not
affect the prediction of how the running speed would evolve. 5 If this were
also true for the law, it would mean that selection of legal rules is a
straightforward process, not hampered by factors other than the pursuit of
finding the best rule available. As we shall see, however, this is not the case
in the real world.
As Darwin intended a theory on how life evolves, other scholars have
expanded his theory to other disciplines. Among these are history,'
psychology,'7 political science," history of science,"9 sociology," ethics,51
linguistics52 and economics. In this section, I will focus on evolutionary
's Jack Hirshlcifer, Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law, in EVOLUTIONARY
ECONOMICS 205 (Ulrich Witt ed., 1993).
4 See SOBER, supra note 31, at 119.
4S See id.
" See THE RETURN OF SCIENCE: EVOLUTIONARY IDEAS AND HISTORY (David Gary Shaw &
Philip Pomper, eds., 1999).
47 See HENRY PLOTKIN, EVOLUTION IN MIND: AN INTRODUCTION To EVOLUTIONARY
PSYCHOLOGY (1997).
48 See F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY (1973-1979).
49 See KARL R. POPPER, OBJECTivE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH (1979).
so See GEOFFREY M. HODGSON, ECONOMICS AND EVOLUTION 81 (1993) (describing the
influence of Herbert Spencer).
st See SOBER, supra note 31, at 202 (explaining the claims on socio-biology and the claims
it makes about explaining morality); E.O. WILSON, SOCIORIoLOGY: THE NEw SYNTHESIS (1975)
(laying the groundwork of sociobiology); R. ALEXANDER, THE BIOLOGY OF MORAL SYSTEMS
(1987).
S2 Cf. JOHN MAYNARD SMITH & EORS SZATHMARY, THE ORIGINS OF LIFE: FROM THE BIRTH
OF LIFE TO THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE (1999) (discussing genetic transformation); J. MAYNARD
SMITH, EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF GAMES (1982) (discussing the evolution of
mathematical models); JOHN H. BECKSTROM, DARWINISM APPLIED: EVOLUTIONARY PATHS TO
SOCIAL GOALS (1993) (discussing social evolution).
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
economics. 3 Also in this application of evolutionary theory, the idea of an
unalterable human nature or of a conscious design is abandoned for the idea
that "selection by the environment" should be the starting point for any
analysis of a social or economic order.' It is a programmatic contention that
some patterns have survived because they were adaptable to environmental
circumstances."5 There is, however, dispute as to the existence of real
evidence for this idea. For example, in neo-classical economics, this evidence
is provided in the sense that only those firms that maximize profit survive the
process of market selection. 6 Neo-classical analysis-excluding uncertainty
anyway 57-- assumes this is the case because of deliberate choices made by
these firms, and usually adds to this that in evolutionary theory the natural
selection process mimics rational decisionmaking: 8 market selection will
produce rational market behavior even if finms display irrational behavior. 9
Should this be true for the law as well, it would be an important point for
the analysis of European private law. The rough transplantation of this idea
to law would mean that even if the legislature decides to enact legislation by
deliberate choice, subsequent selection of rules on the market of legal culture
would produce the same results. It is, however, disputed at this point if neo-
classical analysis is correct. Evolutionary theory makes clear the significance
of "path dependence" in evolutionary processes.' Roe has applied this to the
law.6
" The extensive literature on evolutionary economics includes GEOFFREY M. HODGSON,
EVOLUTION AND INSTITUTIONS: ON EvoumONARY ECONOMICS AND THE EVOLUTION OF
ECONOMICS (1999); Hirschleifer, supra note 43; HODGSON, supra note 50. Cf John Foster,
Biology and Economics, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO INSTrUTIONAL AND EVOLUTIONARY
ECONOMICS A-K 23 (Geoffrey Hodgson et al. eds., 1994); R. NELSON & S.G. WInTER, AN
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982).
s' Elliott, supra note 18, at 60.
s Cf. Jack J. Vromen, Evolutionary Economics: Precursors, Paradigmatic Propositions,
Puzzles and Prospects, ECON. & EvOLUTION 45 (Jan Reijnders ed., 1997).
56 See HODGSON, supra note 53, at 40.
57 f. id.
s' Cf Vromen, supra note 55, at 45.
s Gary S. Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, 70 J. POL ECON. 1, 9-12
(1962); cf Vromen, supra note 55, at 46; HODGSON, supra note 53, at 177 ("[Tlhe assumption
of maximizing behaviour by individual firms is not necessary for the scientific purposes of
prediction.").
'6 Cf Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641,
667(1996).
61 Id.
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The future path that evolution is bound to take depends on the "adaptive
landscape" in which various factors such as environmental conditions (like
natural constraints) are at work. What should be the case, to have a true
spontaneous order evolve, is to have the external environmental conditions
prevail. Many times, however, there are also internal materials (in organisms
these would be genes) that have been shaped by transformations in the past
that are now irreversible. These were responsive to the environment in which
they developed, but are now constraints upon adaptive change.62 The future
development is thus affected by the path it has traced out in the past. In
economic terms: an equilibrium will not originate, and this-as Hodgson puts
it-is in contrast with the view that "real time and history could be safely
ignored." In biology especially, Gould has pointed out that evolution many
times depends on "accidents," leading to an eccentric path," as when in the
economy, the most efficient organizations may not come out on top because
of now irreversible decisions that have been made in the past."5 The lesson to
be learned from this for the law is that evolution of legal norms may not under
all circumstances lead to the best result. The task that lies ahead is to find out
where this strong path dependence has had a formative influence on the law of
the various European countries.
Another insight with which evolutionary economics provides us is that of
the second requirement of natural selection (the inheritability of
characteristics). Some analogy to genes is possible. Notably, Nelson and
Winter use routines as playing the same role in firms as genes do in
organisms.' The routines of a firm establish a stable identity of the firm over
time and-just like genes-theyprogram the behaviour of the firms.67 As long
as the routine is profitable, firms stick to it." Here, again, it goes without
saying that firms are usually not able to change these routines too quickly."
Vromen points out that this is consistent with evolutionary game theory, which
emphasizes that agents have fixed, unalterable behavioral strategies, but
" Hirshleifer, supra note 43, at 205.
" HODGSON, supra note 50, at 204.
See STEPHEN J. GOULD, WONDERFUL LIFE: THE BURGESS SHALE AND THE NATURE OF
HISTORY (1989).
6HODGSON, supra note 53, at 204.
" Vromen, supra note 55, at 52.
67 See id.
" See id.
69 See id. at 53.
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inconsistent with neoclassical economics, which maintains that economic
agents are able to respond in an optimal way to change of circumstances. 7
Some of the insights of the previously mentioned disciplines have been
incorporated into standard "Law and Economics" scholarship. Of course, the
standard hypothesis there is that, since people have a desire to eliminate costs,
the law evolves toward legal rules that minimize social costs and thus increase
economic efficiency.7' This thesis on the evolution of legal norms is closely
related to the more general assertion that the whole of the common law is
efficient.' Rubin and Priest have pointed out that since inefficient rules are
more likely to be disputed in court, these rules change in the re-examination
by the court, while other rules survive.' Cooter and Kornhauser have added
to this that evolution does not necessarily lead to only one surviving efficient
rule, but to some equilibrium of best and worst legal rules, constantly
competing for survival. ' This would be in accordance with modern biology,
in which it is recognized that nature may have very different solutions for one
and the same problem." The problem of path dependence, however, does not
play an important role in present day "Law and Economics" scholarship. Roe
may be right that this is due to the important role that policy plays in this
discipline: evolutionary ideas do not direct us toward some policy direction.76
In the following section, I try to make use of these admittedly eclectic
insights in trying to establish the factors that are decisive for the development
of uniform private law in Europe.
7 See id.
" Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STuD. 51 (1977); George
L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65
(1977).
7 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998).
n See Elliott, supra note 18, at 62.
7 Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the Help
ofJudges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1980).
7 Elliott, supra note 18, at 70.
7' Roe, supra note 60, at 667. Cf. Ugo Mattei & Fabrizio Cafaggi, Comparative Law and
Economics, in I THENEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 346,348 (1998)
("Comparative law and economics contends that history and path-dependency are crucial to
identity causes and modes of legal change.. ").
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V. PREDICTING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AREAS OF
PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE
A. General Observations
What is the importance of the above for the venture of creating a uniform
private law for Europe? I believe that uniform law in Europe primarily comes
about by evolution of legal norms. If this is an apt qualification of the
unification process, it is subject to the more general mechanisms and principles
of evolution just described. First, some general observations that stem from
the previous survey are appropriate for the purpose of this contribution. Then,
I will elaborate some points in more detail.
First, the question should be put to what extent the three Darwinist
requirements for a survival of the fittest are also applicable to European private
law. In an evolutionary theory of European unification, the various national
rules to solve similar problems may be regarded as the necessary variety of
species. This variety has come about through differentiation that started from
one "tree of law" (some general concept of fairness from which the various
rules originated). The second requirement as to the variation in fitness is met
as well, as long as it is presumed that not all the legal rules are as "fit" as
others to carry out their task. Some rules may have been eliminated by the
environment in which they have had to operate; others may have survived
because of their ability to adjust themselves to changing circumstances. The
third requirement (inheritability of characteristics) is met if legal institutions
are looked at as the "genes" of a legal system: the content of these institutions
may differ as the identity of the institution as such remains the same (just like
in economics, routines establish a stable identity of a firm). Just like new
routines of firms are seldom entirely new but are often combinations of old
ones, guaranteeing that the specific identities of these firms are maintained,"
the institutions that program the behaviour of the rules in response to the
changing environment maintain their specific identities as well. This idea calls
for an application in the field of private law (section V.B).
Secondly, evolutionary theory enlightens us regarding the possibility of the
best rule surviving in a "struggle for life." This is definitely not a
straightforward mechanism. To predict which rules survive and which do not,
one cannot just take efficiency or any other mono-explaining mechanism (the
"simple model") as a key-concept. Two different sorts of barriers to the
" See Vromcn, supra note 55, at 53.
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emergence of the best legal rule should be taken into account. First,
historically, the rule that has emerged may have been best adapted to the
environment in which it had to function in the past. Consequently, that some
rules may have been responsive to that past environment, at the same time
eliminating the rules that were not adaptive in those days, but may have been
the best rule for present times if it had not been for their elimination. Selection
on the market of legal rules does not, in this sense, produce the best available
rules. Second, there is a future oriented aspect of this approach as well. Even
if one is able to "reinvent" the rule that disappeared (and legal history can play
an important role in doing so), it may be too costly to have that other rule
prevail over the one to which we have become accustomed. In this case of
path dependence (the future development is affected by the path it has set out
in the past), an equilibrium cannot evolve. "Accidents" may thus be just as
important to explain the past and the future development of law. I will
elaborate this idea with a view to the harmonisation process in different areas
of private law in section V.C.
Thirdly, it is fertile to look at legal rules as having a desire to reproduce
themselves. This analysis may explain why it is that over time identical legal
rules are often used for different goals. This "Funktionswandel" of a rule may
indeed happen more frequently than the clear-cut elimination of a rule. As we
saw that organisms fit themselves into "niches of viability offered by their
environments," legal rules want to survive as well in a changing society. It
then is only because of the use of the same terminology or the embedment
within the same institution that a stable identity remains (this point is related
to the one discussed in section V.B). Legal transplants may-at least
partly-also be explained by this mechanism. Moreover, it is interesting to
discover to what extent the adaptation process in legal rules follows the same
principle as in biology. If the direction of adaptation were indeed toward
simplicity in case of homogenisation of the environment, it would be an
indication of the direction private law would take in a unified Europe (i.e. the
environment of a highly uniform economy). This biological idea is, in my
opinion, very much related to the famous "race to the bottom" argument.7'
Unlike the present debate about that argument-that is merely on a normative
level-evolutionary theory is able to show us that this process may be
inevitable in a changing economic environment (section V.D). This argument
may even be somewhat generalised with a view to the discussion on mentality
as preventing a uniform European private law from coming about.
7 See infra Section V.D.
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B. The Way in Which Private Law Rules Adapt to Changing Circumstances
Considering the venture of creating a uniform private law for Europe, it is
interesting to see what form this law is bound to take. Evolutionary theory
predicts that the external identity of institutions may very well stay the same
while their contents differ. This result is consistent with what legal history
shows us: although concepts like contract, tort, property and marriage may in
name remain identical, their content on the level of rules differs to a great
extent over various periods of time. This combination of an "inherited"
element and an element of variation guarantees that the adaptation of a rule to
a new environment takes place in a not so overt way. To be more precise: a
true elimination of one rule for another is not as likely as the adaptation of
existing rules. Moreover, this adaptation or mutation of rules is not likely to
happen in a stable evolutionary way. In biological evolution, the genes of a
species are stable until there is a crisis (like an asteroid hitting the earth). It is
only then that the species begins to mutate rather quickly and then either dies
or adapts itself to the changed circumstances.79 The species may then be
extremely well adapted for the period of crisis (having the characteristics to
survive that crisis), but not for the period thereafter.
This theory can be substantiated with the following. The environment in
which most of the present legal rules in Europe have survived has been an
environment of a national legal system that was most of the time embedded in
a mixed market economy. Most of the private law rules in continental Europe
were able to survive because of their ability to adapt themselves to these
characteristics. It is thus not much of a surprise that the surviving rules are the
exponents of a liberal and individualistic model: in particular, they were
extremely adapted for the "crisis" of the French Revolution. These rules have
subsequently been laid down in national civil codes. Freedom of contract, the
liability for damages in case of fault and the absoluteness of
property-including the rules originating from these concepts---have thus
survived. To hold the view that these concepts are well adapted for the
present-day environment is, however, hard to maintain. The many
amendments that have been made to the rules emanating from these (still under
the same institutional heading), but in particular the importance that is attached
to open ended norms (like good faith, reasonableness, and negligence),
indicates that the present rules are now much less normative (and thus
Roe, supra note 60, at 663.
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prescribing their future application) than they were at the time of the crisis they
have survived.
A good example of this phenomenon is the elimination of mechanisms that
decide which promises are binding and which are not. Causa and laesio
enormis served this particular purpose in the continental European private law
systems before the great codifications." They were eliminated in the
codification process, or immediately after that, because of their uselessness in
a system that put so much emphasis on the absolutely binding nature of
contracts." It would have been fruitful to have these concepts available in a
later period of time, when contract law had to find a mechanism for deciding
which contracts have to be binding upon the parties and which are not. But in
most European legal systems, courts were not able to refer to these concepts
anymore: they now had to use other legal concepts (good faith, the reliance
principle in contract law and so on) to reach the desired result. It was only in
the common law that the requirement of consideration could still play the role
of distinguishing between promises that were enforceable and those that were
not-although even here this role has become diluted.
The coming into being of a common European market may very well be a
new crisis in the evolutionary sense. It is highly likely that legal institutions
will again receive a different content while keeping their identity in a process
of adaptation. The new environment that is now emerging at high pace is the
European environment of a common market, in contrast to the national
environment of a national market to which most of the rules have adapted
themselves. Joerges rightly points out that market integration leads to a
rationalisation process in which all national law that constitutes an obstacle to
the functioning of the internal market is under a pressure to change."2 This
calls for a survey of which areas of private law will be most affected by this
process.
C. Path Dependence and Areas of European Private Law
It is usually held that the process of emergence of a common market only
calls for the unification of those parts of the law that are vital to that market,
80 Seegenerally JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICALFOUNDATIONS OFMODERN CONTRACT
DOCTRINE (1991).
s1 See id.
82 See Christian Joerges, The Europeanisation of Private Law as a Rationalisation Process
and as a Contest of Disciplines, 3 EuR. REV. PRIVATE L. 175, 179 (1995).
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namely contract law and parts of the law of property (in particular security
interests)." However, from the evolutionary perspective that is chosen in this
Article, we should not be concerned with which parts are to be unified from a
normative perspective, but-more descriptively-which parts are most likely
to be affected by the changing environment."
To decide to what extent uniformity of private law can come about in
Europe, it is at first useful to follow Roe in his concept of weak-form path
dependence.8 5 This type of path dependence only explains what has survived;
it does not entail that the survivor is better than another: "a society chose
between two institutions and the choice became embedded, but the chosen
institution functions as well as the one discarded would have."" A road may
be built at the left bank of the river or at the right bank of the river, but the left
bank is not any "better" than the right bank. 7
In case of this weak-form path dependence, there are no obstacles for
harmonisation. The type of rules one would think of as touched by this form
of path dependence are those related to the more technical aspects of the law.
Whether prescription periods or other time-related devices in the law are two
years, five years or ten years in length is usually arbitrary. In contrast, an
evolution toward some "best" rule is not really feasible in this instance either.
Courts are usually not willing to reconsider these types of legal norms. In this
case, therefore, harmonisation is only possible through the imposition of a rule
in a centralist way. In other words, the framework described in section 11
(uniformity as far as legal culture allows) is not inconsistent with a centralist
imposition of law upon the various European countries.
It is not easy to identify the type of rules just described from other types of
rules. Watson seems to see an important place for these arbitrary rules: "The
truth of the matter seems to be that many legal rules make little impact on
individuals, and that very often it is important that there be a rule; but what
rule actually is adopted is of restricted significance for general human
11 Cf Antonio Gambaro, Perspectives on the Codification of the Law of Property: An
Overview, 5 EUR. REv. PRIVATE L. 497 (1997); Andrea Bonorni, La nicessitJ d'harmonisation
du droit des garanties rdelles mobilihres dans le marchi unique europden, in
L'EuRoPtANISATION DU DRorr PRIVt 497 (F. Werro ed., 1998).
" But see Richard Epstein, A Taste for Privacy? Evolution and the Emergence of a
Naturalistic Ethic, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 665 (1980) (defending the socio-biological thesis that those
who follow rules of conduct have a better chance of surviving than others who do not).
"s See Roe, supra note 60, at 646.
96 Id. at 647.
87 Id.
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happiness."" As far as the substantive parts of contract law, tort law and the
law of property are concerned, I would rather not qualify these as examples of
weak-form path dependence. The idea that it is indifferent as to which rule to
adopt, and that any evolution toward rules better suited for some environment
than others is impossible, is not in line with the idea of these disciplines
evolving to more efficient rules to the fullest extent possible.
This is not to say that path dependence does not play a role in the
traditional private law disciplines. Indeed, forms other than weak path
dependence" are certainly present. If we assume that the Europeanisation of
private law presents a crisis in the evolutionary sense, the path already taken
may thus prevent the best possible rules for the new European environment
from evolving. Evolution leading to a great amount of uniformity is the least
probable where it is only possible to change the present rules at the expense of
high cost. This is the least case with rules that many people rely upon; on the
other hand, the amount of uniformity to be attained should theoretically be the
most in the case of rules that are only of use for parties that set these rules
themselves. Gambaro, for example, states the following about the law of real
property:
When one considers the nature of various property rights
(obligations between neighbours, riparian rights, condominium
law, rights of superficies, servitudes, and the like), it becomes
rather clear that much property law is deeply rooted in locally
developed legal traditions. And, for this reason it is better left to
those local legal traditions which for hundreds of years have
addressed these issues in the manner most adapted to the
locality."
Gambaro is certainly right, but the reason why these rules are looked at as
most adapted to the "locality," has in my view more to do with the investments
that have already been made in the path of property law and from which it is
too costly to deviate, than with "the nature" of property rights. To change the
S WATSON, supra note 1, at 96.
'9 See Roe, supra note 60, at 648 (distinguishing between semi-strong path dependence and
implying that inefficient paths that were once satisfactory are now worth changing even though
they are left intact). In case of strong-form path dependence, the situation is now inefficient and
it would be efficient to change it. Id. at 651. Here, political pressure groups or a lack of
information about "the other way" prevents any change. Id. at 651.
" Gambaro, supra note 83, at 497.
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national law in the areas mentioned by Gambaro would mean that third parties'
interests have to be reconsidered on a very large scale. The reliance of the
parties involved on the existence of "absolute" rights that have effect erga
omnes would be violated if the applicable rules on, for example, the
establishment of limited real rights and the registration of these rights would
be eliminated or even changed. The taking into account of so many different
interests has led to delicate static systems of property law with-most of the
time-a numerus clausus of limited real rights." Moreover, to learn the ins
and outs of property law in a specific system is far more difficult than to learn
a country's law of contract: the information costs of the former are much
higher. 2 In this sense, property law is indeed "stuck in a local equilibrium."
In the most part of property law, this does not pose a true problem: any need
to have uniform law is virtually absent. It is a problem, however, where there
is a need, namely in the field of security interests: here, the desire to create
uniform law and the present practice as it has evolved in the past (adapted as
it is to a national system of law) are the most divergent.
This is all different in the case of the law of contract. The parties to a
contract would not be truly hampered by a change of the law because of their
ability to set the rules for their relationship themselves. The law of contract's
dynamic character guarantees the elimination and survival of rules that are
respectively the least and the most suited for their new environment. Benson
quotes Rubin as he says:
If conditions change... and two individuals decide that, for their
purposes, behaviour that was attractive in the past has ceased to
be useful, they can voluntarily devise a new contract stipulating
any behaviour that they wish. That is, old custom can be quickly
replaced by a new rule of obligation toward certain other
individuals without prior consent of or simultaneous recognition
by everyone in the group (or of some legal authority).93
91 Cf SMrrs, supra note 5, at 249.
92 Cf Meinrad Dreher, Wettbewerb oder Vereinheitlichung der Rechtsordnungen in
Europa?, 54 JURISTENZEITUNG 105, 109 (1999) ("Da Wissen und Kosten eng miteinander
verbunden sind, stellt Unwissenheit zumindest vor Informationskosten und begrenzt so auch die
Faktormobilitit ganz entscheidend.").
" Bruce L. Benson, Evolution of Commercial Law, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAvE DIcTiONARY
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 90 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
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This evolutionary idea is backed up by evidence from both the economic
analysis of law and comparative law.
Economic analysis of law shows the need for a distinction between default
and mandatory rules." This type of analysis makes clear that rules should be
mandatory when any other rule that the parties would adopt would violate third
party interests.' Mattei and Cafaggi rightly point out that the amount of
mandatory rules should decrease in a system where alternative means of
protection of third parties are available. 6 They mention, for example, the
lesser amount of mandatory rules in contract law if the tort system protects
third parties.'7 It is obvious that property law is much more related to these
mandatory rules than contract law."6 The economic reason for property law
being more mandatory runs parallel with the evolutionary idea of property law
being less able to change when confronted with a changing environment.
Comparative law also provides us with evidence on the evolutionary thesis.
Legal transplants in the field of contract law are far greater than in the field of
property law. This may partly be due to private international law's lex reisitae
(accordingly there is no need to incorporate foreign property rights into one's
own legal system), but it is certainly also due to the high costs of transplanting
from another system in the case of property law and the much lesser costs in
the cases of contract and tort law. In the latter, legal transplants have been
vigorous; the relative uniformity that already exists in the field of European
contract law is undoubtedly caused by these transplants. In particular English
law was to a great extent influenced by the civil law of the 19th century," as
continental European law is influenced in the late 20th century by the law of
financial transactions on, for example, swaps, lease and franchising coming
from the common law world.
D. The Race to the Bottom Argument and Evolutionary Theory
Finally, I will investigate whether evolutionary theory gives us some insight
into the famous problem of the "race to the bottom," particularly of interest in
'4 Mattei & Cafaggi, supra note 76, at 348.
"Id.
96Id.
9 Id.
"See id.
,See generally THE RECEpTiON OFCONTENTAL IDEAS IN THE COMMON LAw WORLD 1820-
1920 (Matthias Reimnann ed., 1993).
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company law. Competition of legal systems,'" as opposed to a centralistic
harmonisation, consequently means that companies are free to move from one
state (or country) to another. In doing so, they will choose for the state (or
country) with the lowest standards (like in the case of American company law
the state of Delaware). The "home country control principle" subsequently
guarantees that this low standard is exported to other states as well. What will
eventually evolve is a uniform law of the lowest standard. This race to the
bottom may thus be said to arise when, "in a deregulated internal market, a
state unilaterally lowers its social standards in an attempt to attract business
from other states."'0'
The present debate on the race to the bottom argument is mostly normative:
usually, concerns are expressed about the lowering of standards through
jurisdictional competition. The enactment of mandatory social legislation by
the European Union even has as an explicit goal to avoid social dumping. 2
This contribution addresses the problem from a somewhat different angle:
evolutionary theory may be able to show us to what extent a race to the bottom
is inevitable in a changing economic environment.
As we saw in biology (section IV), the direction of adaptation of a species
is toward simplicity in case of homogenisation of the environment and toward
complexity when the environment still has many unfilled niches. If this were
true for the evolution of private law as well, it would mean that
homogenisation of the economic environment (that indeed originates within
the European Union) leads to simple rules. This seems to confirm that the
"race" is indeed one toward some common legal denominator. Barnard shows,
however, that there is little evidence so far of this phenomenon in Europe. 3
She identifies six conditions that have to be met if a race to the bottom is to
emerge.'" Among these conditions are a wide choice of differentjurisdictions
(like more than fifty legal systems in the United States) and full knowledge of
" See generally Norbert Reich, Competition between Legal Orders. a New Paradigm ofEC
Law?, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 861 (1992); Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution
of Commercial Norms, 26 J. LEGALSTuD. 377 (1997); Dreher, supra note 92, at 105; Catherine
Barnard, Social Dumping and the Race to the Bottom: Some Lessons for the European Union
from Delaware?, 25 EUR. L. REV. 2000, 57, 57-78 (2000).
'0' Barnard, supra note 100, at 57. This "jurisdictional competition" should be distinguished
from the idea offree movement of legal rules (discussed in Smits, supra note 13, at 328). The
former is concerned with choosing some legal system, the latter with choosing some legal rule.
"o See Barnard, supra note 100, at 66.
'03 Id. at 70.
104 Id. at 65-66.
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each jurisdiction's characteristics. 5 These requirements are not met in
Europe where there are only sixteen jurisdictions and where it is often difficult
to obtain the necessary information about the respective legal systems."°
From the evolutionary perspective, a race to the bottom is, however, likely
to emerge if these two requirements are met in the future. As to the first
requirement, the enlargement of the European Union with Eastern-European
states would imply that the differences between the various systems could very
well increase. A migration of companies toward systems with lesser standards
than the present member-states is then likely to occur. In order to meet the
condition of full knowledge of all the European jurisdictions, there is a need
for more comparative law study. The only barrier for a true race to the bottom
would be constituted by the minimum standards of law, set by the European
Union's directives and regulations. However, the fact that these standards are
a barrier to evolution can also be explained by evolutionary theory: the path
that has been traced out in the past, has been in Europe one of not only giving
economic considerations the upper hand. A social policy has always been part
of the European venture. In this sense, the investments already made in this
policy would be too costly (perhaps not only in a social or cultural sense, but
also in a financial sense in that it would entail large costs of changing the
present legal position of workers, unemployed, and so on) from which to
deviate.
That not all of the present social guarantees in the European legal systems
(namely those that guarantee more than the European minimum standards) will
be kept intact, however, is inevitable. Hayek is right when he stresses that
legal rules may have come into being through historical accident, but that
natural selection decides which rules are to survive. The natural selection
process then chooses between competing groups of humans, letting survive
those groups whose cultural norms and rules are more suited to efficiently
coordinate social interactions.' 7 The European venture of creating a common
market, then, necessarily implies that it is the group of those who are best able
to operate on that market whose rules will eventually survive. Worries about
some "mentality" being strangled in this process are therefore not relevant
10s Id.
,06 Id. at 66.
107 F.A. HAYEK, Notes on the Evolution of Systems of Rules of Conduct, in STUDIES IN
PHILOSOPHY, PoLics, AND ECoNoMIcS 66 (1967); but see Viktor Vanberg, Spontaneous
Market Order and Social Rules, in Evolutionary Economics (Cuiriki Witt ed., 1993), supra note
43, at 482 (arguing that there is no "invisible hand" that spontaneously generates "appropriate"
sets of rules).
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anymore: that would be the irreversible consequence of an internal market
coming about.
V1. CLOSING REMARKS
To predict to what extent the different areas of private law will evolve
toward some uniform system is not an easy task. To adopt an evolutionary
perspective on unification may, however, be useful. I do not contend that
evolutionary theory is the only framework that provides us with explanatory
predictions on how a European private law will develop, but it does provide
us with some fruitful insights on the way legal rules adapt themselves to
changing circumstances, on path dependence and on the probability of a race
to the bottom. The mere fact that not all areas of private law are to the same
extent touched by the unification process is insightful for what public policy
should entail in this field. To adopt some European directive or regulation in
the field of property law appears, for example, to be too costly because of the
strong path dependence in this area of the law.
What is perhaps the most important outcome of evolutionary theory applied
to the law is that the coming into being of a uniform law for Europe will to a
large extent be the result of the emergence of a spontaneous order that has not
so much to do with a deliberate enactment of law by some Sovereign, but much
more with a "cultural evolution." As Hayek puts it: culture is not rationally
designed, but a tradition of "rules of conduct" that are passed on through
cultural transmission in a process that is not consciously planned." 8 A system
of rules should primarily be looked at as a spontaneous order that emerges in
response to its environment. In this sense, the whole venture of creating a
common European market automatically invokes a new, partly unintended,
legal system.
" HAYEK, supra note 107, at 66.

